‘Let it not be forgotten’, the Bengali radical M.N. Roy had written in 1926, ‘that the Punjab is the centre of the Hindu-Moslem conflicts that radiate from there to all other parts of India’.  

The second half of the twenties saw social and political currents in the Punjab receding from the ideal of an inclusionary nationalism towards an apparently unbending kind of exclusionary communitarianism. This had encouraged at least one historian to depict the decade as a ‘prelude to partition’. Yet the Punjab in this period can just as easily be seen as providing alternative visions of nationalisms which seriously challenged the notion of one nation and undivided sovereignty propagated by the Congress.

The preeminent view of Indian nationalism has been that of an inclusionary, accommodative, consensual and popular anti-colonial struggle. This has entailed denigrating the exclusive affinities of religion as ‘communal’ in an imagined hierarchy of collectivities crowned by the ideal of a ‘nation’ unsullied by narrow minded bigotry. By implying that religious affiliations are, if not necessarily bigoted, then certainly less worthy than identifications with the ‘nation’, Indian nationalism comes dangerously close to trampling over its own coat tails. The cultural roots of Indian nationalism owed far more to religious ideals, reinterpreted and reconfigured in imaginative fashion, than has been acknowledged. According to Partha Chatterjee, who takes the cultural fragment represented by certain Bengali Hindu middle class intellectuals to illuminate the consciousness of the Indian nation as a whole, religion provided the spiritual stores for resisting and negotiating the inherent materiality of both western modernity and British rule. While giving more respectability to religious sentiments and symbols than they have tended to enjoy in the past, Chatterjee does so by invoking a dichotomy between an autonomous inner spiritual and a dominated outer material domain. This is an ingenious way of skirting around the problem of dismantling the binary opposition between ‘secular nationalism’ and religious communalism on which so much of the ideological edifice of the post-colonial Indian nation-state has rested.

Engrossed with the construction of the nationalist hegemony, Chatterjee glosses over the unresolved tensions and continued contestations that marked the terrain of both region and religion. Although conceding that ‘the real difficulty was with Islam in India’ which gave ‘rise to alternative hegemonic efforts than the one based on the evocation of a classical Hindu past’, he stops short of considering the substance of these alternatives. Such an investigation of the cultural roots of nationalism leaves unexamined the myriad subaltern contestations of an emerging mainstream nationalism which like its adversary, colonialism, may well have only achieved dominance without hegemony.

To name this dominance hegemony is to confuse the claims of one strand of nationalist discourse with its ability to ensure cultural, not to mention, political acquiescence. It also underplays the exclusionary aspect of this nationalism which only succeeded in eliciting a stronger reaction.
from its sceptics and critics. This was particularly true of the Indian Muslims engaged in redefining their religiously informed cultural identity in the face of a modernity underwritten by the fact of British sovereignty. Continued recourse to the colonial privileging of religious distinctions thwarted many well meaning attempts at accommodating differences within a broad framework of Indian nationalism. So long as the dominant discourse among Indians was tainted by notions of religious majoritarianism and minoritarianism there could be no hard and fast separation between ‘nationalism’ and ‘communalism’. Far from being an irritating side show, the inversion of the all-India majority and minority equation in the Punjab was at the centre stage of the struggle between nationalism and imperialism.

Regional, Religious or National Rights?:

The land of the five rivers was the locus of some of the more interesting ideas on how the rights of religious communities might be reconciled with the imperatives of Indian unity. In 1924 the solution to the problem of contested sovereignty in the Punjab proposed by Lala Lajpat Rai, the preeminent Hindu nationalist of that region, was to partition the province in order to make the principle of majority rule effective. This might in turn open the way to a possible federation of autonomous Hindu and Muslim states in Bengal. Rai’s proposal for a division of the two main Muslim-dominated provinces was not a prelude to a partition of India; it was a laboured attempt to forestall such an eventuality. A partitioned Punjab and Bengal were to remain part of an undivided India under Hindu majority rule.

Championing the regional rights of Punjabi Hindus, Rai drew comfort from the fact of a Hindu majority at the all-India centre guaranteeing their national rights. Religion was the premise of both the regional and national rights of the Hindu community in the Punjab. And yet Lajpat Rai, proclaimed himself to be an opponent of mixing religion with politics. His recipe for settling the problem of difference through division was anathema to many Punjabi Muslims. But they were equally averse to the ideas of Mohamed Ali, an Islamic universalist venturing forth as an Indian nationalist, who held that the only religious requirement of the Muslims was to ensure that swaraj or independence did not undermine their religious rights. If Mohamed Ali conceded the possibility of Muslim citizenship in a non-Muslim state, Muhammad Iqbal transformed the very parameters of the debate by rejecting the European born idea of the separation of the spiritual and material domains.

According to Iqbal, the spiritual and the temporal domains were not distinct in Islam since ‘the nature of the act, however secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it’. Rejecting the post-enlightenment misperception of the binary opposition between the spiritual and temporal as ‘two distinct and separate realities’, Iqbal affirmed both the ‘unity of man’ and Islam as ‘a single unanalyzable reality’ in which the religious and political aspects depended on positionally specific observations. The ‘working idea’ of tauhid, the binding principle of a Muslim’s submission to Allah, was ‘equality, solidarity and freedom’. It was incumbent upon the state from an Islamic point of view ‘to endeavour to transform these ideal principles’ into reality.5

‘It was in this alone’, the leading intellectual light in Muslim India noted, ‘that the State in Islam is a theocracy’. This was not a form of government ‘headed by a representative of God on earth...screening his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility’. An Islamic ‘theocracy’ sought to ‘realize the spiritual in a human organization’.6 Giving a wholly different spin to what has come
to be associated with the term ‘secular’, Iqbal’s philosophical vision aided by an understanding of Islam collapsed the meaning of sacred and profane. The secular was ‘sacred in the roots of its being’. There was ‘no such thing as a profane world’.

The over-zealousness of Turkish nationalists in embracing the European idea of the separation of the church and state bordered on profanity. ‘Such a thing could never happen in Islam’, Iqbal asserted, ‘for Islam was from the very beginning a civil society, having received from the Quran a set of simple legal principles which, like the twelve tables of the Romans, carried...great potentialities of expansion and development by interpretation’. The principle of *ijtihad* or independent judgement allowed Muslims to constantly adjust to the imperatives of social change without abandoning the Islamic path. Contrary to the view of the religious scholars, Iqbal believed that since the institution of the *khalifa* had ceased to exist the right of *ijtihad* should be vested in an elected Muslim assembly which was the ‘only possible form Ijma could take in modern times’.7 In opting for the republican form of government and collective *ijtihad* by the Grand National Assembly, the Turks alone among the Muslims had asserted the right of intellectual freedom conferred by Islam.8

Yet on the separation of church and state they had gone too far. Iqbal alerted Muslims to the dangers of becoming overawed by the currents of western liberalism. As he put it:

*Khara na kar saka mujhe jalwa danish-i-farang*

*Soorma hai meri ankhoon ka khak-i-Madina wa Najf*

The light of foreign wisdom does not dazzle me
The kohl lining my eyelids is the dust of Mecca and Najf.9

Iqbal’s principal critique of western enlightenment philosophy was that it had taken the freedom of free thinking to such extreme limits as to deny that ‘all human life is spiritual’. Islam on the other hand was ‘an emotional system of unification’ which ‘recognizes the worth of the individual’ and ‘rejects blood-relationship as a basis of human unity’ and ‘demands loyalty to God, not to thrones’.10 It followed that *ijtihad* was meaningless if denuded of religious spirit. What Iqbal’s philosophical reconstructions of Islamic thought made plain was the gaping chasm between a view of Indian nationalism based on keeping religion out of politics and the normative Muslim conception of treating the spiritual and temporal domains in non-oppositional terms.

What then was the precise significance of religion in the politics of colonial India? The separation of religion and politics expounded by Congress nationalists and rejected by those branded ‘communalists’ took on very different connotations at the regional and the all-India levels. Religiously informed cultural differences were emphasized to claim regional rights but deemed illegitimate if insisted upon by a geographically disparate numerical minority as the criteria for the distribution of national rights. It was this contradictory logic which gave religion the handle that it came to enjoy in the politics of late colonial India. As region interacted with an emerging conception of the nation, variously appropriated by the votaries of the majoritarian community, those reduced to minority status by virtue of their religious affiliation had reasonable grounds for apprehension. Emphatic assertions of an inclusionary nationalism based on the separation of the spiritual from the material, the religious from the political and the emotional from the rational seemed to marginalize the problem of cultural difference rather than give it the centrality it had come to occupy in the discourse and politics of communitarianism. If fragments of the majority community could pose their demand for regional rights in the language of religiously informed cultural differences, then the
members of a ‘national’ minority could hardly be expected to do otherwise. By clinging more obstinately to the politics of cultural difference, a statutory minority might at least extract some safeguards. After all, ‘the respect for cultural diversity and different ways of life finds it impossible to articulate itself in the unitary rationalism of the language of rights’.

But it had to do so on a collective basis in order to get a hearing from the colonial state whose tinted spectacles saw India in terms of essentialized but not adequately existentialized religious blocs.

Playing notes borrowed from liberal democratic theory in the communitarian key, Lajpat Rai had issued an ultimatum to Muslim Punjab that separation may have to be the price for majority rule premised on religion. He was perfectly correct that separate electorates for Muslims and the matching ‘communalization’ of government through religiously defined quotas were a devastating blow to the homogenizing claims of an inclusionary nationalism. But it was his equally impassioned defence of the rights of Punjabi Hindus which betrayed to many Muslims the hollowness of the nationalist discourse. The bait of equal citizenship in an independent India carried the price tag of singularity and homogeneity which was rudely at odds with narratives dipped in the language of cultural difference. To make matters worse, they were expected to rally to the call of a unified and uncontested sovereignty which conferred upon them minority status with no prospect of relief in the fact of their regional majority. Inequality in the terms of representation could hardly be expected to produce the conditions for equality of citizenship.

Even if the issue of cultural difference could be settled through negotiations on the quantum of state intervention in religion, there was no guaranteeing that Hindu-majority rule would not try and efface the marks of the Islamic impact on the subcontinent. Imbued with the wonder of a union of the mother Goddess with the territorial homeland. Hindu India’s vision of Bharatvarsha was dramatically at odds with the individual and collective Muslim belief in the absolute sovereignty of a universal God. That it could give rise to a rich variety of ideas on identity and sovereignty has been amply suggested in the views of Mohamed Ali and Iqbal, two men wedded to the universalist pledge in Islam who chose initially at least to occupy different niches in the politics of Indian Muslims.

It had the added advantage of being more relevant to India’s political and intellectual legacies than a discourse on nationalism shaped by Europe’s history of the formation of nation-states. As Iqbal put it in one of his zarifana or humorous verses:

We eastern innocents have entangled our hearts with a west
Where there are crystal chalices and here only an old earthen pot
All will perish in this era except the one
Who is established in way and firm in conviction
Oh Sheikh and Brahman, do you hear what the scriptural say
From what high heavens nations have fallen
Here it is either conferences on mutual love; the ways of love were established
Or disputes over Urdu and Hindi, cow sacrifice and jhatka.13

Between Region and Nation: the Missing Center

After the late 1920s, the legitimizing glory of Congress’s inclusionary nationalism rested on precisely the ‘unitary rationalism of the language of rights’ which, according to Chatterjee, is incapable of respecting cultural difference. Appropriating the colonial state’s disputable claims of non-interference in the religious and cultural concerns of its subjects was convenient for those with
an eye to power at the all-India centre. But this entailed losing sight of unfolding developments in
the regions and taking refuge in a conception that came dangerously close to abolishing the fact of
difference. Concerned with advancing their interests in a context where the state conferred favours
to communities of religion, regional peoples were expected to readily embrace an idea of
inclusionary nationalism holding out the promise of equal citizenship rights, irrespective of
community, caste or class. It is precisely because they had not given up thinking of themselves as
part of an Indian whole that the idea of majoritarianism seized the imaginations of Hindus and
Muslims alike.

Punjab reveals in stark fashion the importance of majorities claiming regional,
religious and national rights. The connections between region and nation which Lajpat Rai had
mapped out in his arguments on rights were entirely in accord with his religiously informed sense of
cultural identity. Since Hindus were fortuitously in a ‘majority’ in India, a Punjabi Hindu of Lajpat
Rai’s ambitions could live with the idea of separating the religious and the temporal realms. This
was a formulation flatly rejected by Muslims who agreed that their communitarian rights had to be
safeguarded in any future constitutional agreement. The principal obstacle to Muslim support for a
future constitution was not separate electorates but the issue of provincial majorities. Having
proclaimed the ‘secular’ to be sacred to the core, Muhammad Iqbal upon entering the formal arena
of politics in the Punjab declared that ‘agreement on only religious matters would not eliminate all
the differences’.14 ‘The mantra of rights being chanted by the Hindus, and echoed variously by the
Sikhs, touched on temporal issues that impinged on the exercise of ‘secular’ state authority. While
focusing on the rights of Muslims, and those of the Punjab especially, Iqbal continued emphasising
the compatibility between an Indian and an Islamic identity. It was ‘completely wrong’, he asserted,
to say that ‘the Muslim psyche was devoid of any spirit of love for the homeland’. Besides love of
the homeland, Muslims felt passionately about Islam. It was this passion that could bring together
the disparate individuals of the community.15

Iqbal’s 1930 presidential address to the All-India Muslim League is a key to
understanding the Muslim discourse on identity, sovereignty and citizenship in late colonial India.
Was it possible ‘to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and...reject it as a polity’ in order to embrace the
idea of ‘national polities’ in which religion played no part? It was ‘unthinkable’ for Muslims to
subscribe to the ‘construction of a polity on national lines’ by abandoning ‘the Islamic principle of
solidarity’. Referring to Ernest Renan’s definition of a nation as the expression of a collective ‘moral
consciousness’, Iqbal observed that the affinities of caste and religion in India had resisted ‘sink[ing]
their respective individualities in a larger whole’. Whatever their own internal divisions various
groupings in India were unwilling to pay the price of fashioning a common national moral
consciousness if it meant the extinction of their cultural distinctiveness. It was imperative to
‘recognize facts’ and ‘not assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist’.16

Yet Iqbal’s call for a Muslim state in north-western India did not envisage a severance
of all ties with Hindustan. In contesting their part in relation to the whole of India, Muslims quite as
much as other religious groupings were asserting rights to territories based on religiously informed
cultural identities. But they were still mainly challenging the Congress’s right to indivisible
sovereignty, not rejecting any sort of identification with India. Muslim schemes seeking to align
notions of religiously informed cultural difference with political claims of territorial sovereignty
were trying to keep alive the idea if not the reality of an India extending from the Khyber Pass in the
north-western marcher regions to the Bay of Bengal in the east, and from the city of exquisite
monuments to keep alive the spirit and memory of the Sultanate and the great Mughals to the
southern most tip of Kanyakumari.

**Muslim Community-Turned-Nation: the Demand for Pakistan:**

Conceding territorial sovereignty to a heterogeneous community turned homogenous ‘nation’ was a more vexed issue than has been generally acknowledged by those charting the course to separate statehood by India’s Muslims. In putting forward a claim to nationhood in 1940, Indian Muslims were decidedly revolting against minoritarianism, caricatured as ‘religious communalism’. As Mohammed Ali Jinnah confessed, the idea of being a minority had been around for so long that ‘we have got used to it...these settled notions sometimes are very difficult to remove’. But the time had come to unsettle the notion since the ‘word “Nationalist has now become the play of conjurers in politics’! No less a conjurer than Lajpat Rai, Jinnah came away from the League’s Lahore session with a mixed bag of tricks.

While the insistence on national status for Indian Muslims was absolute, the demand for a separate and sovereign state and its relationship with a Hindustan containing almost as many Muslims remained open to negotiation until the late summer of 1946. The claim that Muslims constituted a ‘nation’ was not incompatible with a federal or confederal state structure covering the whole of India. But for the federal idea to be acceptable, the logic of majoritarianism and minoritarianism had to be abandoned and the fact of contested sovereignty acknowledged. In keeping with the better part of India’s history, the overture to shared sovereignty enunciated by Jinnah and the League seemed the best way of tackling the dilemma posed by the absence of any neat equation between Muslim identity and territory. With ‘nations’ straddling states, the boundaries between them had to be permeable and flexible, not impenetrable and absolute. This is why Jinnah and the League were to remain implacably opposed to a partition of the Punjab and Bengal along religious lines even while furthering the cause of a political division of India between ‘Pakistan’ and ‘Hindustan’.

Nudged on by the provincial Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikh reaction to the ‘Pakistan’ demand is of crucial significance in tracing the historical backdrop to the partition of the province. Together with the Congress, this combination held a key to the future of the Punjab. Unless satisfied with their share of representation in a Muslim dominated province, not to mention a separate state, there could be no question of keeping non-Muslims within such an administrative unit against their will. Contestations over sovereignty in the Punjab rarely conceded and usually claimed territory. Some twenty years after it had first been proposed as a solution to Muslim-majority rule in the Punjab, Muslims were no more prepared to countenance the partition of the province, far less discuss the geographical frontiers of a divided India. All that changed after March 1940 was that ‘Pakistan’ had become a familiar name for an intangible congeries of imaginings. Most Muslims deemed it consistent with an all-India arrangement. With many Muslims coming to subscribe in principle to ‘Pakistan’, however defined, most Hindus took their formal stand on an ‘Akhand Bharat’ or an undivided India. Sikhs under Master Tara Singh’s direction were angling for an ‘Azad Punjab’ or an independent province where they might have a controlling hand. Exclusively based on arguments about religious majorities and minorities, these narratives of communitarian identity and notions of sovereignty singularly lacked a careful spelling out of the rights of equal citizenship. Attributing this to ‘communalism’ would be to overly simplify the issue. The prospect of an independent India where numerical majorities would shape the apportionment of power and patronage gave added importance to communitarian rights. Drawing upon cultural
differences, the expression of these rights in the politics of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs alike. Confounded spirit and matter, the religious and the secular. Shades of bigotry informed most versions of the narratives of communitarian identity and rights. But there was also a great deal in them which sheds light on the problem of equitable citizenship rights in a historical context requiring accommodation of cultural differences. To dismiss both bigotry and cultural difference in the same breath as ‘communalism’ may serve the purposes of historical short hand. It cannot go very far in explaining why an inclusionary nationalism failed to excite the imaginings of so many in the Punjab.

The Muslim trickle to the League’s ‘Pakistan’ was partly a reaction to the activities of the Hindu Mahasabha and its para-military wing, the RSS. The Mahasabha’s charge that Congress was ‘unrepresentative of Hindu opinion’ was not a rejection of the nationalist organization. There was a constant overlap between the Congress and the Mahasabha in the Punjab where it was often the same individuals who voiced the Hindu-Hindi-Hindustan slogan most loudly. After the announcement of Rajagopalachari’s partition formula of 1944, what collapsed all ends of the Hindu political spectrum was the discovery that, all said and done, even the apex decision-making body of the all-India Mahasabha did not really oppose Rajagopalachari’s conception of a ‘Pakistan’. This was the second instance within a span of twenty years that Punjabi Hindus had shown a willingness to concede Muslim-majority rule at the price of separating the non-Muslim majority districts in the eastern parts of the province. There was no room here for negotiating with the League’s demand for ‘Pakistan’.

The significance of the 1945-46 elections was not lost on the key players or the bystanders in the political arenas of British India. Only a privileged 12.5% of the total population and a mere 11% of Muslims had the actual right of political choice. This does not diminish the role of the informal arenas of politics in the Punjab, especially the popular press and its networks of information and propaganda. There had been extensive debates in the press on the merits and demerits of an ‘Akhand Hindustan’, a ‘Pakistan’ an ‘Azad Punjab’ and ‘Khalistan’, to mention only the larger conceptions of territorial sovereignty in the province. A possible division of India with or without a partition of the Punjab had entered the realm of public discussions. Jinnah and the League were demanding the whole of the Punjab for ‘Pakistan’ - a prospect bitterly opposed by Hindus and Sikhs. Jawaharlal Nehru, who visited the Punjab in the early fall of 1945, stated categorically that ‘federations were better than partitions’. Looking to galvanize electoral support, Nehru seized upon the INA issue. Paying rich tributes to Subhas Chandra Bose, he demanded ‘sympathetic treatment’ for the ‘misguided patriots’ of the Azad Hind Fauj. The vast majority of Bose’s army were from the Punjab. There was much sympathy with the INA in Punjab cutting across communitarian lines. This gave the Congress a temporary reprieve in a province that was vital to the constitutional negotiations at the centre.

Beyond the contradiction of an irreligious party demanding a Muslim state and most of the religious guardians rallying behind a nationalist party committed to a ‘secular’ vision, little is known of what the uses of religion conveyed to the voters of the Punjab. Religion was deployed by all parties. Signing its own death warrant among Muslim voters, the Congress left the anti-imperialist cause on the sturdy shoulders of the Ahrars and the Jamiat-ul-Hind ulema whose forked tongues had bitten into many raw nerves in Muslim Punjab. But ‘castigat[ing] Jinnah and other League leaders for their religious shortcomings’ no longer had a spellbinding effect. The rout of Congress’s Muslim supporters in the Punjab should not distract from the impact they made at the level of political discourse. Putting the fear of God into the hearts and minds of Leaguers was no mean achievement. Aided by a team of mostly Barelvi ulema, hurriedly brought under a freshly
created Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, Punjabi Leaguers tried surpassing their temporal calling by appropriating Islamic idioms. The induction of hell fire by *pirs* and *maulvis* for the greater cause of religion bore no resemblance to Iqbal’s translation of *tauhid* as ‘equality, justice and freedom’, the founding principles of any state in Islam.

Although the largest single party in the new provincial assembly, the Muslim League found itself locked out of the Punjab ministry headed by Khizar Hayat Tiwana. This made it more difficult to prevent Punjabis from striking at their own jugular. Blaming the failure on religious zeal, of whatever combination, can only satisfy those impatient with the Punjab and its history of short and intense warfare followed by protracted, if uneasy, compromises. The elections of 1945-46, pitting Muslim against Muslim, and the politically significant aftermath of a Congress, Unionist and Akali coalition ministry had advertised the impossibility of exclusively Muslim rule in an undivided Punjab - a potential turning point in the history of a province that held the key to an united India. If it could get over the shock of being stopped in its trails, the Punjab League might conceivably change the balance of power between region and nation. But it had somehow to satisfy non-Muslims that they would be granted equal rights of citizenship in ‘Pakistan’. Class and ideological divisions among Muslims, and not simply their political and cultural differences with non-Muslims, made this a difficult objective to realise.

Stating maximum demands did not mean abandoning possibilities of accommodation. Muslim Leaguers had not given up on the prospect of an agreement with the Congress or the Akalis. Nor had the Sikhs made up their mind on whether they wanted a separate state of ‘Khalistan’ or an accommodation with the Muslim League or the Congress. Hoping to replace the Union Jack over the Lahore Fort with the Sikh flag, the erstwhile sovereigns of the Punjab could not be given short shrift by the departing raj. Governor Jenkins warned Wavell that ignoring the Sikhs would ‘seriously obstruct any agreed arrangement in the Punjab’. This was ‘not a parochial point’. On the fault line of region and nation, the Sikhs were central to the all-India arrangements. At an earlier stage of his negotiations with the cabinet mission, ‘Jinnah had been very anxious to come to terms with the Sikhs’. The chances of serious negotiations with the Akalis improved considerably after the all-India League on 26 June 1946 formally accepted the cabinet’s mission’s plan for a three-tiered all-India federation. Even as late as mid-July the Akali camp had not swung decisively in either the direction of the League or the Congress. Nehru’s rejection of the grouping scheme in the cabinet mission plan as well as a weak centre put paid to the League’s hopes of a united Punjab. Yet the new policy of supporting the Congress had ‘not met with universal Sikh approval’. There were ‘apprehensi[ons]’ about a ‘Congress game...to use the Sikhs as shock troops against the Muslims’.

Sadly for the protagonists of a united Punjab, the logic of a Muslim-Sikh agreement was coming to prevail just when the chances of its attainment were getting overwrought by a confluence of developments at the centre, the region and other parts of India. Kept out of power in the province, Punjabi Leaguers detected ‘a deep-laid plot between the British and the Congress’ and were bitter, frightened and angry - an altogether deadly compound. Jenkins’ grand gesture to parliamentary propriety and a delicate communitarian balance - the formation of the coalition ministry - had done less for unity than division. Despite a succession of opportunities, Punjabi Leaguers more obsessed with ousting the ministry failed to take advantage of Sikh doubts about the wisdom of an outright alliance with the Congress.

Anyone with an iota of sense could see the ‘danger, ever present in the Punjab, of a competent riposte to League disorder from the turbulent Sikh minority’. The passage of well over six months before the Sikhs erupted to avenge their marginalization is of critical importance in an
evaluation of the options open to Punjabis in the final few months of colonial rule. During the second half of 1946 an uneasy armed truce prevailed in the Punjab until the crumbling of the administrative edifice turned the sword arm of India into its biggest killing field. Religion did play a part as a marker of social distinction. But religion as identity owed nothing to religion as faith. Confusing the two, as a historiography operating in a binary mode is wont to do, has ended up essentializing religion and, worse still, blurring the myriad textures of localized social violence under the grand rubric of ‘communalism’. The preparations for civil war and actual outbreaks of violence highlight the precarious balance between the individual and the community quite as often as the supposed triumph of the community over the individual.

The League’s ‘direct action’ movement against the coalition ministry drew popular Muslim support, but seriously offended non-Muslims. Yet remarkable as it seems, the decisive refusal of Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs to accept a League ministry or ‘Pakistan’ did not make the partition of the province any more acceptable to the vast majority of Punjabis. This was true even after 3 March 1947 when the premier buckled under League pressure and resigned. In a statement on 8 March, a number of Sikh and Hindu leaders, including three former ministers, made it known they were ‘opposed to Pakistan in any shape or form’. If this was the overture, the all-India Congress working committee provided the finale on the same day by resolving to demand the partition of the Punjab. Hindus and Sikhs hailed the decision. Muslims created history by unanimously condemning the Congress’s move which did more to ‘widen...the cleavage between the communities’ than the violence itself.

The old and tired portrait of the Punjab in the grips of an all pervasive fever, exclusively pitting Hindu against Muslim and Muslim against Sikh is accurate only to a point. The vision of religiously defined communities banding together in absolute unison explodes amidst harsh criticisms of the provincial and all-India leadership, as well as anger and horror at the bankruptcy and collapse of their political will. Punjabis may have been especially unwilling to make concessions to rival communities, but the vast majority were equally averse to a partition of the province on purely religious lines. The imposition of an all-India solution on the Punjab and the response it generated in a society pulverized by colonial constructions is a tragic tale of woe. No one put it more poignantly than Talukchand Mahroom, the Punjabi Hindu poet of Urdu who in March 1947 bemoaned the destruction of a regional ethos of which he had once been proud:

Tearing the clothing off human superiority
This frenzied dance in the joy of nudity is destructive
You have shown such barbarity in your achievements
Reducing to dust the honour of humanity
From the high heavens the call will come night and day
Alas Punjab, pity on you and your culture!

Separating at Close Quarters: the Punjab Partitioned

The redesigning of the spatial landscape of India by the British, the Congress and the Muslim League was accompanied by pitched battles for social space in the localities that were fought mainly, but not exclusively, along lines of religious community. Violence intensified communitarian feelings, but was rarely perpetrated by collectivities as a whole. Demobilized soldiers were more often than not in the forefront of violence committed in the name of communities. Individuals, even when grouped in armed militias, could settle personal scores in the process of promoting and
protecting members of their community. Keeping an eye on the balance between the individual and the community offers far more penetrating insights into the human dimension of social violence than permitted by overarching categories like Muslim, Hindu and Sikh. Barbarity attributed to entire communities has effaced the role of individuals and given far greater legitimacy to the social violence that accompanied the partition of the Punjab than is warranted by the evidence.32

The localized and personalized nature of the battles for social space in a province facing an impending division on the basis of religious enumeration shaped the frequency, intensity and thrust of the violence in the Punjab. Without denying the communitarian dimension of the killings, one should not discount the possibility of personalized violence passing off as ‘communal’, simply because of the presumed conveniences of the term in both colonial and nationalist discourse. Sadaat Hasan Manto in ‘Parhiya Kalima’, or recite the kalima, provides a chilling account of a Hindu woman killing off her Hindu lover and acquiring a Muslim one on the condition that he help her dispense with the dead body. Taking advantage of the disturbed conditions and breaking the curfew, the new paramour placed the corpse in a garbage dump outside a mosque. That night the mosque was burned down by Hindus and the body was never found. After surviving a murderous assault by the woman, who moves on to a new lover, the Muslim ends up stabbing his replacement to death. This, as he explains in the story, had nothing whatsoever to do with ‘Pakistan’. True, his victim was Hindu. But la illah illa Allah, he tells the Muslim policemen, this was at best a crime of passion and at worst an act of self defence. What it could not possibly be described as was ‘communal violence’.33

Creating amorphous configurations in hotly contested space, groups of banded individuals were fighting battles for control in urban and rural localities that were as vital to them personally as they were to the purported interests of their respective communities. With entire districts being apportioned on the basis of religious affiliations recorded by census enumerators, violence was directed by gangs representing majorities against minorities with a view to ejecting them through fear, terror and murderous means. Religion, if it was the primary issue, had mostly profane manifestations. The banding of individuals in localities to protect their home and hearth as well as their property owed something to the discourse and politics of communitarianism, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh. But it was so variously interpreted and deployed as to thoroughly implode the category of ‘communal violence’ within which each local incident has tended to be cast. There was nothing to prevent members of religious communities from taking advantage of an impending division of the spatio-temporal domain to advance their personal claims on public space. Outlandish territorial demands by community leaders were accompanied by strategies to appropriate the property of neighbours - the price of separating at close quarters could not have been crueler.

Communitarian identities were throughout strained by sub-regional and class differences. The Congress’s call for a partition of the Punjab had brought out the difficulties of reconciling religiously informed identities with imaginings of territorial sovereignty. If Muslims in eastern Punjab were petrified at the prospect of their homes being parcelled out to the non-Muslim areas, Hindus in western and central Punjab were quite as averse to losing their properties to ‘Pakistan’. Sikhs with commercial and industrial interests plumped in favour of a partition, leading to the creation of a new province consisting of the Ambala and Jullundur divisions as well as Delhi. But Sikh landed interests, represented by Giani Kartar Singh’s group, wanted the territory between Chenab and Sutlej where they owned large estates. Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs had conceded a partition with no intention of parting with the choicest parts of the province.34

By the time the 3 June plan was announced, there was organized and semi-organized
incendiaryism, stabbings and bomb blasts in both Lahore and Amritsar. In an indication of the speed
with which social space was falling vacant in the province, an estimated seventy to eighty thousand
had fled the two cities. A rising graph of violence doomed such chances as existed for an agreed
solution to the problem of power-sharing in the Punjab. Yet no less significant was the relative
balance between centre and region in the final negotiations which produced the 3 June partition
plan. The Punjab governor thought it was ‘ludicrous’ for ‘so-called League leaders...to take orders
from Bombay from a person entirely ignorant of Punjab conditions’. He was equally opposed to
the Congress high command’s meddling in Punjabi affairs. By wielding the partitioner’s axe to
placate the Congress, the British would have ‘reduced what might be a powerful country to two petty
leadership had, in conjunction with the larger imperatives of Jinnah and the Congress high
command, ‘already fooled away a kingdom’. Any conception of India’s future requiring the picture
at the centre to emerge before etching one for the Punjab was completely ‘topsy-turvy’. The ‘right
course’, surely, was to ‘determine the future of the units in a way acceptable to their inhabitants and
then to sketch the all-India picture’.

It was arrangements at the centre, not the problem of individuals and communities inhabiting
contested space in the regions, which allowed Mountbatten to dictate the terms of the all-India
settlement to Jinnah and the Congress leadership. There was ‘a complete absence of enthusiasm for
the partition plan’ in the Punjab, ‘nobody seem[ed] pleased and nobody...want[ed] to get on with the
job’. Yet the political parties for very different reasons were ready to ‘acquiesce’ to the plan. Muslim
Leaguers thought it was ‘a master-stroke by Jinnah’ in the vain hope that he would ultimately ‘get
them all they want’. Congressmen, for their part, thought the plan was ‘a master-stroke by Patel,
who, having pushed the Muslims into a corner (or into two corners)’ would ‘destroy them before
very long’. As for the Sikhs, they were on red alert in districts they considered vital. Until the
boundary line had been announced, they ‘refused to go very far with partition’.

Later reactions to the partition proposal reflected sub-regional and class considerations even
more powerfully than communitarian ones. Even after the AIML’s formal acceptance of partition,
Punjabis cutting across communitarian divisions were jealously guarding their claims to social
spaces, embodying both the material and the spiritual aspects of their individual and collective
identities. The resistance to displacement was most pronounced among Sikhs and Muslims, neither
of whom were ‘showing any sign of being willing either to give up their present abode, or to submit
lightly to any kind of domination by the other’. Unreconciled to the loss of Lahore, Hindus were
relying on RSS cadres in battles for social spaces in the wards and mohallas of Lahore. The RSS
was also strengthening its organization in Jammu and Kashmir in anticipation of a Muslim bid for
power.

Although the MLNG had not been nearly as conspicuous as the RSS, it was ‘significant that
70 per cent of the new fires in Lahore...occurred in non-Muslim houses’. Banded individuals were
‘creating havoc with the tacit approval of the local Muslim League leaders’. After legislators from
the eastern districts of the provincial assembly formally voted on 23 June to dissolve the
administrative unity of the Punjab, the League seemed more ‘earnest in its apparent endeavour to
recreate a sense of law and order’ in Pakistan’s territories. Assurances of fair treatment to minorities
in western Punjab were looked upon with suspicion by Hindus, most of whom were planning to
migrate. Yet those who migrated were also the first ones to reaffirm the bond of familiar social space
by returning home. In one of those delicious ironies, Muslims in western Punjab who had ‘suffered
inconvenience on account of the absence of their banias’ were seen to be capable of ‘cherish[ing]
them more if they...[came] back'.

If it was to be administratively viable, not ‘a nightmare tapestry of futurist design’, Pakistan had to have a ‘workable’ and ‘practicable’ boundary, ‘not...a crazy line running backwards and forwards’ in and out of villages in several districts. It was impossible for the boundary commission to satisfy wildly clashing claims to territories in the Punjab. Attacks on Muslims in Amritsar by early August alarmed Sikhs and Hindus in western Punjab who feared reprisals. Exhortations by Hindu and Sikh leaders to non-Muslim minorities to remain in the districts to which they belonged and promises by Muslim League leaders of ‘protection and equal treatment’ did nothing to ‘dispel the panic’. Gandhi, paying a courtesy visit to the Punjab on his way back from Kashmir, was greeted with posters ‘asking him to retire from politics’.

The disregard of the human dimension in the political bargaining at the all-India level was coming to haunt the national leadership with a vengeance. Sardar Shaukat Hayat has recalled his shock and horror at the painful discovery that Muslim men in Amritsar had abandoned their women and children for the safety of Lahore. Callousness was matched by cowardice in one village where Muslim men hid in the sugarcane fields while a band of Sikhs carried away young girls and set fire to a house where they had pushed all the old women and children. In one instance, a terrified young woman left her child on the road side when told by the driver of a bus full of Muslims that there was space for only one person. Collective memories of violence in social spaces, embodying some of the strongest identities of individuals and collectivities, have woven a dark shroud over the corpse of undivided Punjab. A scrupulous sifting of the threads, however, confirms the personalized and localized nature of the violence as well as the singular victimization of women - Muslim, Hindu and Sikh - by men purportedly battling to safeguard their communitarian interests.

An analysis of the violence, perpetrated as well as suffered in the Punjab, offers quite astonishing insights into the social attitudes which marked the birth of independent citizenship in South Asia. The sacred rapidly turned profane in the process of advancing the battle for sovereignty in different tehsils and districts. The award of the Punjab boundary commission, whose announcement was postponed to allow for the transfer of power ceremonies to proceed, predictably ‘caused much disappointment’. Muslim suspicions of British bad faith and the influx of refugees from eastern Punjab spelt the end for non-Muslims in the western districts. The final phase of the violence saw clashing identities and contested sovereignties ripping apart the moral and the spatial landscape of the Punjab. Refugees from Amritsar incited some Muslims in west Punjab to commit arson, looting and stabbing against non-Muslims. Significantly, while the people of Lahore wanted ‘a quick return to normal conditions, the malevolent element from the East Punjab [we]re exploiting the discontent and advocat[ing] retaliation’.

One way to minimise social dislocations was to offer allegiance to the new state. In Rawalpindi, Hindu refugees participated in the hoisting of the Pakistan flag. In Chakwal and Jhelum, Sikh commissioned officers presented arms to the national flag. Non-Muslims in Jhelum made donations to Muslim refugees’ funds and appealed to their co-religionists in eastern Punjab to put a stop to the lawlessness. ‘Sober-minded Muslims’ were ‘endeavouring to persuade non-Muslims to stay on in the West Punjab’. But the general clearing of social spaces had begun in the localities and districts of the Punjab. Armed thugs, frequently assisted by the local MLNG, and even elements in the police and the army, carried out a systematic campaign of loot. The nexus of citizenship in Pakistan and, by extension, India, as the Congress insisted Hindustan be known, had a bloody baptism that cannot be ascribed to religion by any stretch of the imagination.

Muslim excesses against their Hindu and Sikh neighbours in western Punjab assumed
appalling proportions which no amount of nationalist self-justification can wash away. This was not to be the ideal state of Islam of which the poet-philosopher of Punjabi Muslims had spoken in his reconstruction lectures. Far from providing any basis for the realisation of the spiritual in each individual, far less the collectivity, in temporal activity, this was a state born of the purely material greed which the chaos of the British departure let loose in the Punjab. The situation was much the same in India. Muslims in Delhi were attacked and their property seized. This had catalytic effects in western Punjab. There were cases of conversion, both voluntary and involuntary, especially in Jhelum, Gujrat and Sargodha. Even an unsympathetic commentator like G.D.Khosla believes that it was ‘not religious emotion or aggressive chauvinism…but the prospect of personal gain’ which prompted Muslim outrages against Hindus and Sikhs in Jhelum. By late August a mere sixty members of the RSS remained in the district. When it came to the crunch, volunteer corps did more to shed innocent blood than protect the lives and property of co-religionists. Escaping to areas where numerical strength was on their side, the RSS quite as much as the MLNG preferred the offensive rather than the defensive path.

The material benefits of the battles for social space in both parts of the Punjab accrued to individuals, not local communities. And there can certainly be no vindication of criminal actions in pursuit of zar and zamin, or wealth and property which, together with zan or women were the three constitutive elements of material culture in the north western areas constituting the territories of Pakistan. Banded individuals were amassing wealth and property at other peoples’ expense. In Campbellpur, Pathans from Mianwali and the NWFP, ‘out for loot, more on criminal than communal lines’, did not spare local Muslim residents. If the quest for zar and zamin had led to unpardonable offenses against members of all three communities, the debasement of zan assumed nightmarish proportions. Maulvi Maula Bakhsh, the khatib of the Juma masjid in Rawalpindi told a congregation of 3000 Muslims that 25,000 Muslim girls had been abducted by Sikhs in eastern Punjab. The situation in Kashmir was ‘a permanent menace to Muslims’. Dogra raids on Sialkot and the abduction of Muslim women merely served to confirm the paranoia. The image of Kashmir as a powerless woman enslaved by Dogra rulers had never failed to excite Punjabi Muslims. Yet the decorum of wanting to rescue the symbol of a ravished woman married awkwardly with attitudes towards the living and the real. Unidentified Muslim men, operating as local gangs, had been abducting and raping non-Muslim women. There was nevertheless anguish upon hearing that a column of Muslim evacuees on its way to Pakistan had been mercilessly attacked by Sikh jathas in Ferozepur district. But if there were only a few characters like Khushwant Singh’s Jagga in the Sikh community, there were men of the Muslim community, as Manto has depicted in his classic story ‘Khol Do’, for whom Sirajuddin’s daughter Sakina was first and foremost woman as prostitute, not ornament, irrespective of her religious identity as a Muslim.

All said and done, the commonality of masculinity was stronger than the bond of religion. Men of all three communities delighted in their momentary sense of power over vulnerable women; such was the courage of these citizens of newly independent states. Gender eroded the barriers that religion had been forced to create. Whatever women may have accomplished by aligning their interests with nationalist organizations, it was more as abstractions appended to the religious community seeking sovereign statehood than as substantive subjects constituting the nation. Women’s meagre achievements in defence of their own interests were vividly in evidence during partition violence in which they were the main victims. Alas, the Punjab had betrayed its patriarchal bent more decisively than the affective affinities of religious community. In the
memorable words of Amrita Pritam invoking the spirit of the author of the legendary qisa or folk-tale Heer-Ranjha while composing the ultimate epithet for undivided Punjab:

Today I call upon Waris Shah
To rise from the grave and speak
And plead with him to open another page in the book of love
One daughter of the Punjab had cried
And you were moved to write reams on her sorrow
Today thousands of crying daughters
Call upon you, o, Waris Shah
O you, the sympathizer of the broken hearted,
Arise and see your Punjab.
Today dead bodies are cramming the forests
And the Chenab is brimming with blood
Someone has mixed poison with the water of the five rivers
And that water has spread all over the land.58

4Ibid., pp.73-74.
6Ibid., pp.122-23.
7Ibid., p.138.
8Ibid., p.124.
9Muhammad Iqbal, Bal-i-Jabrial in Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, Karachi (no date), p.34.
11Partha Chatterjee, ‘Secularism and Toleration’ in Economic and Political Weekly, July 9, 1994, p.1773. Yet the notion of a blend of individual and collective rights was available in the realm of Muslim political philosophy which had reached beyond the rigid boundaries of a unitary colonial rationality.
12The attack on Urdu - a symbol of Muslim adaptation to its Indian setting - had been one of the cruelest cuts inflicted by the rhetoric of Hindu, Hindi and Hindustan.

13*Hum mashriq kai maskeenon ka dil maghrib main ja atka hai*
  Wahan kantar sab buloori hain yaan aik purana matka hai
  Iss duor main sab mitt jain ghai, haan baqi wo rahe jai gha
  Jo qaim apni rah pai hai aur paka apni hat ka hai
  Aie Sheikh o Brahman! Suney ho kiya ahl-i-baserat kahte hain
  Gardon nai kitne bulandi saay oon qaumoon dai patka hai
  Ya baham piyar kai jalse thay; dastoor-i-muhabat qaim tha
  Ya bahis main Urdu-Hindi hai, ya qurbani ya jatka hai.


11 Jinnah’s presidential address to the AIML in March 1940 in Ibid., p.335.


15 Inqilab, 10 September 1929 in Ibid., p.91.


18 Jinnah’s presidential address to the AIML in March 1940 in Ibid., p.335.


19 Secret Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Lahore, 1 September 1945, vol.lxvii, no.32, NCHCR, Islamabad, p.102.


21 Intelligence Bureau (Home Department), 23 September 1946, TP, vol.viii, p.577.


23 Jenkins to Wavell, 15 July 1946, Ibid., p.60.


36 Note by Jenkins, 20 March 1947, TP, .ix, p.997.
37 Enclosure to Jenkins to Wavell, 7 March 1947, Ibid., p.881.
38 Note by Jenkins, 20 March 1947, Ibid., p.997.
41 Ibid, p.330.
42 Ibid.
44 See the Muslim League’s memorandum to the Punjab boundary commission in *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol.1, pp.283-84 and 287-89.
49 Khosla, *Stern Reckoning*, pp.120-216.